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During the so-called Pre-March Period from the end of the Napoleonic
Wars in 1815 to the revolutionary upheaval in 1848, Italy played an im-
portant role in the European States System as created at the Congress
of Vienna.1 Standing midway between the Ottoman Empire, entirely
left out of this system of the public law of Europe, and Germany, pro-
tected by its legal rules as well as the strong bonds of the German Con-
federation, Italy was a member of the European family but politically
disunited, formed by small states without any supranational body that
would have offered them protection against external threat. Conse-
quently, the Apennines after 1815 were an easier target for the Great
Powers’ ambitions than Central Europe, where the German Confeder-
ation granted extraordinary security to its members while simultane-
ously preserving their sovereignty. The result for Italy was that in the
decades following the Congress of Vienna it represented a vulnerable
1 This paper has beenwritten as a part of the research project GA15-04973S financed
by the Czech Science Foundation (GA CˇR).
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point in the lower regions of the Continent, in other words of the or-
der established at this congress, by attracting the attention of the self-
serving and sometimes even illegal conduct of the European Powers
and failing to offer a suitable environment for the better cooperation of
its usually minor princes jealous of their own sovereignty, something
the German Confederation actually did.
How problematic Italy was for the European States System before
1848 is also evident from the fact – often neglected by historians and
political scientists – that the first war between two European countries
after the end of the Napoleonic Wars occurred in the Apennines ow-
ing to the Sardinian Kingdom’s invasion of Austria’s Lombardy. In
fact, the attention paid to Italian events in surveys of the functioning
of this system is surprisingly low. One can mention here the promi-
nent works in the Anglo-Saxon and German speaking milieus: Paul
W. Schroeder’s Transformation of European Politics with little attention
paid to Italy and Matthias Schulz’s Normen und Praxis almost omitting
it, for example, completely ignoring the important Anglo-Neapolitan
Sulphur Crisis of 1840.2 There are naturally a considerable number of
studies on particular issues concerning Italy, including some surveys
of the relations between specific countries of the peninsula and various
European Powers, but they usually lack amore complex – all-European
– outlook.3 The result is that an in-depth evaluation of Italy’s role in the
European States System in 1815–1848 has never been offered.
If one attempts to embark upon this ambitious task and evaluate
Italy’s importance on the Pre-March diplomatic chessboard, it is neces-
sary to take into consideration several challenges which must first be
overcome. Primary among them is not to get mired in the phraseology
of the Risorgimento, in other words not to attribute too much value to
2 P.W. SCHROEDER, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848, Oxford 1996;
M. SCHULZ,Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicher-
heitsrat, 1815–1860, München 2009.
3 See for example G. BERTI, Russia e stati italieni nel Risorgimento, Torino 1957; N.
ROSSELLI, Inghilterra e regno di Sardegna dal 1815 al 1847, Torino 1954; P. SILVA, La
Monarchia di Luglio e l’Italia. Studio di storia diplomatica, Torino 1917.
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Italian nationalism, something of secondary importance for the analy-
sis of Italy’s position in the European States System before 1848. It is
much more important to remain upon the solid ground of legal norms
which form the pillars of every political system and the willingness of
the countries to obey to them: the extent of this willingness contributes
to the stability or fragility of the system. This means to analyse pri-
marily the competition of the Great Powers in Italy, their relations with
Italian princes and, last but not least, the mutual relationships between
these princes. Although the question of nationalism and political re-
form constituted an important factor influencing the decision-making
of the Great Powers as well as the individual Italian princes, one can-
not overestimate its importance on the predominantly pragmatic and
egoistic conduct of the political elites. After all, the Sardinian attack
against Austria in 1848, which equalled an offence against the whole
states system, resulted rather from dynastic ambitions of the Savoyan
dynasty than from Italian-nationalist aspirations.
Another obstacle that is necessary to overcome is the Risorgimento
legend or rather legends concerning the conduct of the various players
on the chessboard of European-Italian politics, especially the Austrian
Empire, which was a popular target of numerous imputations raised
by its contemporaries and often blindly adopted by large numbers of
nationalist, liberal, left-wing or simply superficial historians. Despite
the revisionist and from a scholarly perspective respectable approach
of other historians, especially since the mid-20th century, the situation
still resembles a minefield where every step can lead to an explosion.
It is therefore all the more necessary to base one’s research upon a care-
ful study of primary sources of various kinds, with diplomatic corre-
spondence being of course the most important. Even if a considerable
number of official letters have been published owing to the editorial
activities of Italian historians, a vast archival research must be under-
taken at all costs, both in Italian and other European archives.4
4 From excellent revisionist works see above all D. LAVEN, Venice and Venetia Un-
der the Habsburgs, 1815–1835, New York 2002; A. J. REINERMAN, Austria and the
Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Vol. 1: Between Conflict and Cooperation 1809–1830,
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Having placed the research of the topic upon a more realist-legal
and unprejudiced approach and extensive work with primary sources,
one more fact is necessary to keep in mind: Italy constituted a point in-
terconnected with other areas where the Great Powers competed for
influence and supremacy, and therefore the area was influenced by
events in other parts of Europe or even the world, while simultane-
ously serving as a source of similar influence on other regions of the
Continent. It is thus necessary to gain a considerable understanding
of the course of events beyond the Apennines during the period under
study to be able to explain Italy’s role in the European States System
in the wider context of European as well as global politics. What it ac-
tually means will be further explained later in this article focusing on
the later phase of the Pre-March Period from 1830–1848 since it was
not until the July Revolution in France in 1830 that Italy experienced
the renewed competition of Austria and France together with Great
Britain’s increasing interference in Italian affairs as time went by, all of
which undermined the credibility of the European Concert in the eyes
of Italian ruling elites, which, combined with the distrust of a certain
portion of the Italian public, weakened their faith in the stability of the
European States System.
The evidence for such a pessimistic claim can be found in three prin-
cipal periods when Italy played an important role on the international
stage: first, in 1830–1832 when Austria served as the region’s police-
man for crushing several rebellions in the peninsula and France jeal-
ously opposed the extension of the former’s influence, which finally
led to the French occupation of Ancona; second, in 1840 when, in the
first half of the year, Europe witnessed the so-called British-Neapolitan
Sulphur-War and, in the second half, during the so-called Rhine Crisis,
when Italy faced the threat of a general war; third, in 1846–1848 when
Italy experienced turbulent events to which the Great Powers were un-
able to find a response that could protect the order as established in
Washington 1979, and the same: Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich.
Vol. 2: Revolution and Reaction, 1830–1848, Washington 1989.
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1815 and finally witnessed not only the outbreak of revolutionary up-
heaval but also the first open – warlike – breach of the system by the
Sardinian aggression against Austria.
The revolution in France in 1830 represented an important turning
point not only in French history but also in the position of Italy on the
international scene: in the preceding 15 years the traditional compe-
tition of the Habsburgs and France had receded into the background
owing to the general post-Napoleonic fatigue. Although the cabinet
in Paris attentively observed Austria’s steps in this part of Europe and
diplomatically supported the resistance of some Italian states against
Metternich’s attempts to increase Austria’s influence through the cre-
ation of an Italian league or a general police commission inMilan, it did
not dare to pursue a more ambitious and hostile policy to undermine
Austria’s hegemony in the peninsula. When revolutions broke out in
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Piedmont in 1820–1821, France
allowed Austria to crush them without much opposition. After July
1830, however, this tolerance ended and Paris began to play a more
active role.
The reason for this more contrastive policy was the traditional de-
sire of the French political elites regardless of the regimes for France’s
dominance over the Apennines; consequently, they always considered
the Apennines as part of her natural sphere of influence and Austria as
her traditional rival. If before 1830 this arrogant attitude of the French
was predominantly a matter of private debates, then after the July
Revolution it gained an influence on the Parisian cabinet’s decision-
making. The internal weakness of King Louis Philippe’s regime in the
months following the revolution made his policy more vulnerable to
attacks from domestic opposition. A considerable number of voices
called for a more active foreign policy compatible with French “glory”
and “dignity”, even for one supporting the liberal changes in other
parts of Europe with force. France’s attitude was symbolised by the
policy of non-intervention, a principle promoted by her government
on the turn of August 1830 for preventing other Great Powers from
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intervening in neighbouring Belgium where a revolution broke out at
that time.5
For some French diplomats the policy of non-intervention was a
genuinemeans for aiding the success of revolutionaries in Europe since
this principle was to prevent any counter-revolutionary intervention of
the three conservative Powers – Austria, Prussia, and Russia – against
revolutionary regimes. However, without much exaggeration, for all
French citizens interested in these political issues, including those po-
litically more restrained and with little inclination to spread revolu-
tion beyond France’s frontier, this principle was a suitable means for
destroying Austria’s political supremacy and increasing France’s own
control over Italy. This principle, unilaterally proclaimed by France
and never accepted by the three conservative Powers, served as an
instrument for interfering in the internal affairs of Italian countries:
France tried to dictate which ones could request external military as-
sistance and which ones could not. This ploy was incompatible with
the existing public law since each independent country could ask an-
other one for diplomatic or military assistance and the latter was enti-
tled to offer or decline it; but regarding France’s military strength and
revolutionary potential – the ability to gain the support of revolutionar-
ies beyond her frontiers through revolutionary propaganda, the Italian
rulers had to take her dictatorial attitude into account and expect her
eventual hostile reaction in the event that they called on Austria for
assistance against their own rebellious subjects.6
The danger of France’s adverse reaction became imminent in early
1831 when revolutions broke out in Modena, Parma and the Papal
States and Austria’s military intervention became a distinct probabil-
ity. France threatened with counter-action, and some French diplomats
5 H.A.C. COLLINGHAM, The JulyMonarchy. A Political History of France 1830–1848,
London, New York 1988, p. 186.
6 COLLINGHAM, pp. 187–190; E. de GUICHEN, La révolution de Juillet 1830 et
l’Europe, Paris [?], p. 171; N. JOLICOEUR, La politique ètrangère de la France au
début de la monarchie de juillet. De la non-intervention à la contre-intervention
(1830–1832), in: Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 121, 2008, pp. 11–29.
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even claimed that a war in such a case was inevitable. All this rhetoric
had two aims: first, to win public support at home, and, second, to
deter Austria from unilateral actions and force her to cooperate with
France on the issue of resolving Italian problems, thereby sharing the
influence with her. However, Metternich did not want to yield in what
was for him and Austria so crucial a matter as the crushing of the re-
volts in Italy, and he did not hesitate to send Austrian troops to the
aid of the three regimes threatened by revolution. The intervention
was so prompt and successful that France was assigned to the role of
a mere bystander who finally had to accept the outcome. Until that
moment, however, the Italian rulers were severely threatened by the
prospect of a war between the two Great Powers that would have def-
initely brought the Apennines into conflagration.7
To placate France Metternich agreed with negotiations in Rome on
the improvement of the Papal administration, a measure that would
appease the aggrieved inhabitants of the rebellious regions. The French
government could thus present its policy as humanitarian and liberal,
but in fact this merely masked France’s real aim: to force Austria to
recall her troops from the Papal States as soon as possible owing to
the approaching parliamentary elections in France. Metternich, who
wished to strengthen the moderate political forces in France, finally
gave way; when this happened, the French lost most of their interest
in the reforms. This reformatory concern actually never was a genuine
aspect of French Italian policy, which was primarily directed against
Austria’s influence in the following years, and subsequent events soon
proved this when another revolt broke out in the Papal Legations on
the turn of 1831.8
When the Papal troops failed to defeat the insurgents, the pope
again asked Austria for military intervention, which took place in late
January 1832. At that moment, however, the French government did
7 A. J. REINERMAN, Metternich, the Powers, and the 1831 Italian Crisis, in: Central
European History, 10, 3, 1977, pp. 206–219.
8 W. BAUMGART, Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung. Internationale
Beziehungen 1830–1878, München – Wien – Zürich 1999, pp. 278–279.
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not remain passive and reacted by sending troops to the Papal town of
Ancona in the Adriatic; the French soldiers occupied the town, arrested
high Papal dignitaries and hoisted the French flag over the citadel.
The way in which the French expeditionary force seized the town was
shocking, but in principle the main problem lay in the fact that France
invaded a country in peace time. From the point of public law this was
an obvious act of aggression, but given the unequal strength of the two
countries the pope could do nothing more than repeat formal protests
against the violation of his sovereignty. Since Austria was not willing
to wage war with France on behalf of Ancona, the pope finally recon-
ciled himself with the unrequested occupation of Ancona by the French
and formally agreed in mid-April 1832 that the town would remain in
the French hands until the evacuation of the Legations by the Austri-
ans, which did not happen before late 1838. This, however, did not
alter the fact that the sovereignty of the Papal States had been seriously
attacked.9
The French occupation of Ancona was a serious blow to interna-
tional law and was generally understood as such by European gov-
ernments and the public. This act of disdain of a strong nation to-
wards a weak one weakened the trust of smaller countries, naturally
in particular those in Italy, in the fairness of the European States Sys-
tem. They were horrified by the ease of the aggression and the acqui-
escence of the other Great Powers to this infringement of legal norms.
Across Europe people recalled the Battle of Navarino in 1827 when the
British, Russian and French fleets destroyed the Ottoman naval forces
in peace time, much like the French expedition to Ottoman Algeria in
1830 against the Ottoman sultan’s will: the crucial legal difference was
9 N. BIANCHI (ed.), Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia dall’anno 1814
all’anno 1861, Vol. 3: Anni 1830–1846, Torino 1867, pp. 101–114; F. FALASCHI,
L’occupazione francese di Ancona del 1932, in: Rassegna storica del Risorgimento,
15, 1928, pp. 118–142; M. GISCI, Un episodio dell rivalità franco-austriaca nello
Stato Pontificio, in: Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 17, 1931, pp. 365–447; G.
NATALI, La rivoluzione italiana del 1831–1832 e sue immediate conseguenze, Bologna
1956, pp. 106–110.
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that the Ottoman Empire was situated outside the European States Sys-
tem, whereas the Papal States were, or rather should have been, pro-
tected by the public law of Europe. However, the reality proved to be
very different from theory and the Europeans could see how insecure
the smaller European countries could be against the dominance of the
Great Powers: the latter’s aggression first towards the sultan and then
the pope demonstrated it could be aimed at other European monarchs
at any time. The Ancona affair signified for the ruling elites in Italy the
climax of France’s efforts to violate their sovereignty by the principle
of non-intervention through which she tried to limit the other states’
freedom of action on the international scene. Austria, although acting
in perfect compliance with the legal norms, also suffered from this af-
fair since the Italian rulers observed that she did nothing to defend the
pope’s sovereignty, the Sardinian king even being disappointed that
she did not declare war on France owing to the occupation of Ancona.10
Another reason for the distrust of the existing political system of
Europe was presented to the Italian monarchs by the so-called Sulphur
War of the spring of 1840. The cause of this affair must be sought in
1838 when the king of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II,
granted a French company the monopoly on the trade with Sicilian
sulphur, thereby harming the interests of the British merchants. The
cabinet in London tried for some time to persuade the king to revoke
his decision, and when this did not happen, in the spring of 1840 the
Foreign Secretary, Henry John Temple Viscount Palmerston, ordered
the British fleet to seize commercial vessels sailing under the Sicilian
flag. This act of hostility in peace time forced Ferdinand II to yield
and with the help of France’s meditation to surrender completely to
the British predominance: the result of the whole affair was the king’s
10 M. GISCI, Un episodio dell rivalità franco-austriaca nello Stato Pontificio, in:
Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 17, 1931, pp. 365–447; N. RODOLICO, Un dis-
egno di Lega italiana del 1833, in: Archivio storico italiano, 93, 1935, pp. 232–233;
D. LAVEN, Austria’s Policy Reconsidered. Revolution and Reform in Restoration
Italy, in: Modern Italy, 2, 1, 1997, p. 19.
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humiliation, the abolition of the monopoly in July and the payment of
indemnities to both the British and French merchants.11
The British actions in the whole affair were not only aggressive with
the capture of about fourteen Neapolitan commercial vessels by British
warships though no war had been officially declared but also illegal
because the Neapolitan king had not violated any treaty stipulations
between the two countries. This opinion on the illegality of the British
conduct was stated later not only by several historians and experts on
international law but also by contemporaries, including British Queen
Victoria’s legal advisor, who changed his mind only under pressure. It
was not international law but the wielding of power that shaped in-
ternational relations, and Ferdinand II had to bow under the weight of
British might. As American historian and expert on this topic Dennis
W. Thomson recently stated, “the British Government was accustomed to
having its way with Naples for many years. Faced with resistance from unex-
pected quarters, Palmerston reacted with anger and disbelief. It was unthink-
able that an Autocratic ruler of a lesser State, whose role was to cooperate or
acquiesce, would presume to challenge the Foreign Policy of a Great Power”.12
Much like the Ancona affair, the conflict over Sicilian sulphur was
generally observed by the European public. The people, even far be-
yond the Alps, could not fail to notice that when faced with this act
of aggression by one Great Power, no other tried to defend the weak
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies against its unjustified claims. Metternich
criticised the British conduct but did not want to protest too much
on behalf of the inept Sicilian king against Great Britain’s overwhelm-
ing maritime power, especially when he needed her cooperation in the
more serious Near Eastern crisis, the Russian tsar did not want to upset
11 H. ACTON, The Last Bourbons of Naples (1825–1861), London 1961, pp. 111–126;
J. A. DAVIS, Palmerston and the Sicilian Sulphur Crisis of 1840. An Episode in the
Imperialism of Free Trade, in: Risorgimento, 1, 2, 1982, pp. 5–22; D.W. THOMP-
SON, Prelude to the Sulphur War of 1840. The Neapolitan Perspective, in: Euro-
pean History Quarterly, 25, 2, 1995, pp. 163–180.
12 Cited in E. di RIENZO, Il Regno delle Due Sicilie e le Potenze europee 1830–1861,
Soveria Mannelli 2012, p. 34.
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Palmerston for the same reason, France was Britain’s accomplice and
Prussia had no direct interests in Italy. Consequently, the members of
the Concert sanctioned this international crime through their silence,
something the weaker countries saw all too well and which gave them
another reason to distrust the Concert’s willingness to be fair.13
The fear of the dictatorship of the Great Powers over other smaller
European states was connected with the aggressive conduct of some of
the former outside the Continent, in other words in the regions situated
outside the public law. For the Sulphur War, the Opium War between
Great Britain and China was of the greatest significance: the grounds
for the British conduct in both conflicts were identical – the effort to
impose on the two countries Britain’s own commercial conditions con-
cerning, in the first case sulphur, in the second one opium. In both
cases the British argued with freedom of trade; however, this merely
masked their economic imperialism, fittingly named later the imperi-
alism of free trade. The similarity between their actions towards the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and China was obvious to a considerable
number of Europeans who began to fear that the aggressive policy pur-
sued against the states beyond what they thought of as “civilisation”
would be implemented towards those they considered “civilised”, in
other words that the protection offered by international law was even
less reliable than ever before.14
This widespread sense of inferiority and vulnerability was strength-
ened during the second half of 1840 owing to the Rhine Crisis caused
by the Near Eastern crisis mentioned above. When France disagreed
with the other Great Powers about the settlement of the ongoing cri-
sis in the Ottoman Empire and found herself isolated and humiliated
when they decided to proceed without her concurrence, she began to
threaten a war on the Rhine and in Italy from the end of July. The
whole affair was finally settled peacefully, but until the winter Europe
13 M. ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich and the Anglo-Neapolitan Sulphur Crisis of 1840, in: Jour-
nal of Modern Italian Studies, 16, 1, 2011, pp. 1–18.
14 M. ŠEDIVÝ, Italy during the Rhine Crisis of 1840, in: European Review of His-
tory/Revue européenne d’histoire, 22, 3, 2015, pp. 486–504.
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was seized with a considerable war-scare that also seized the Italian
countries. Although they had nothing to do with the whole dispute
among the Great Powers, they could hardly escape a war because of
France’s probable invasion of Italy in her effort to attack Austria. In
this event, Piedmont would be the first Italian state to be dragged into
the conflict, but one could hardly expect that central Italy would escape
the same fate, especially when France threatened to support her war
campaign with revolutionary propaganda using the discontent of Eu-
ropean liberals and democrats against their conservative governments.
Regarding the actual discontent of the Italians with their living and po-
litical conditions, the outbreak of rebellions throughout the peninsula
was predictable.15
The Italian countries without exception were unsurprisingly eager
to maintain their neutrality in the event of war. However, they greatly
feared that the Great Powers would not allow them to do so and, con-
trary to the public law, would force them to choose sides. This partic-
ularly held for Piedmont because she possessed the best fighting army
of all Italian countries, of course with the exception of Austria, and
controlled important Alpine routes from France to the Apennines. The
temptation came from France as well as the allied four Powers, the
latter being less scrupulous and finally forcing the country to express
sympathies for their case. This little respect for the neutrality of smaller
countries was another expression of the Great Powers’ limited regard
for the international law when they did not find complying with it to
be favourable to their interests. The Italian governments therefore had
one more reason for concern about the conduct of the Great Powers, es-
pecially when the Sulphur War was in living memory and the Ancona
affair by no means forgotten in late 1840: the latter contributed to the
widespread fear of a new French military expedition against a strategic
point on Italian coast, and this eventuality was hotly debated not only
in Italy but also in other parts of Europe.16
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
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The above-mentioned affairs led to the decrease in the confidence
of Italian governments in the fairness of the existing international sys-
tem, an apprehension also shared by some Italians. It is certain that the
same feeling led to the increase of geopolitical thinking in Germany,
which contributed to the more chauvinistic and aggressive opinions of
some German nationalists against the hostile and self-serving conduct
of Great Britain, Russia and France; it is also evident that Italian na-
tionalists also counted among the reasons for the unification of Italy
the necessity to put an end to the interference of foreign Powers into
Italian affairs. It was a certain paradox that they primarily disliked
Austria though she behaved with much greater respect towards the
precepts of international law than either France or Great Britain. This,
however, meant little for both the Italians dissatisfied with the political
system they lived in and the rulers jealous of Austria’s power and led
to the situation where Italian liberals and democrats hated Austria for
her role as an anti-revolutionary policeman and the rulers disliked her
efforts, albeit quite mild, to guide them.17
This widespread aversion towards Austria climaxed in 1846–1848
owing to several affairs inciting Austrophobia among the Italians,
above all the economic conflict between Vienna and Turin concerning
the transport and sale of salt and Piedmont wines, the annexation of
Cracow by Austria in the autumn of 1846 that was strongly opposed
by the Italian rulers guarding their sovereignty as well as those Italians
calling for national independence, and the strengthening of Austrian
troops in the Papal town of Ferrara during the summer of 1847 that
was generally regarded in Italy as illegal and an affront to the pope.
Consequently, the constitutional and especially national movements
in Italy from late 1847 were inflected with anti-Austrian hatred. The
fact that some criticism of Austria’s Italian policy was exaggerated or
even invented was not important for that moment; when Piedmont at-
tacked the Austrian empire in March 1848 in order to deprive it of its
Italian possessions, and with this step openly breached the order of the
17 C. GATTERER, Erbfeindschaft Italien-Österreich, Wien – München – Zürich 1972,
p. 10.
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Congress of Vienna, she won general approval throughout the Apen-
nines.18
One can thus see that the conduct of some Great Powers, not al-
ways legal, towards Italy had repercussions against the whole Euro-
pean States System, paradoxically striking the one among them that
manifested considerable respect for the public law. The explanation
for this outcome was in part given above but not in full – it is also nec-
essary to search for it in the conduct of the Italian countries themselves,
which reveals that the whole story was not black and white but that the
Italian rulers were also partly responsible for the decay of the European
States System after 1815.
The position of the Italian monarchs vis-a-vis the Great Powers was
often weakened by their mutual distrust, jealousy and commitment to
their independence, which resulted in their reluctance to assume coop-
erative obligations like the German princes did in the German Confed-
eration that preserved the independence of its member states but, si-
multaneously, offered them a solid kind of protection against external
threat. As for their relations with Austria, the Italian monarchs usu-
ally exploited her willingness to help them against revolutions when
necessary but were otherwise generally unwilling to pay anything for
this protection and attentively guarded their sovereignty. The most
suitable examples were the actions of Ferdinand II and Sardinian King
Charles Albert, both counting on Austria’s support in times of need
but unwilling to fulfil their obligations towards this Power if it was not
advantageous for them. Even worse for the Habsburg Monarchy, the
Sardinian king desired to enlarge his dominions at its expense when
presented with an opportune moment to do so, which happened in
March 1848 when the revolutions broke out in Lombardy and Venetia.
Charles Albert opened a military campaign with the aim of expelling
the Austrians from Italy, not for any nationalist reasons which were en-
tirely alien to him but for traditional dynastic ambitions of the House
of Savoy.19
18 G. F.-H. BERKELEY – J. BERKELEY, Italy in the Making. January 1st 1848 to Novem-
ber 16th 1848, Cambridge 1968, p. 64.
88
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
M. Šedivý, Italy in the European States System. . . , pp. 75–90
It was therefore not Austria but Piedmont that became in the latter
part of the Pre-March Period themost serious threat for the geopolitical
status quo in Italy. Actually Metternich was forced to pursue a rather
passive policy and nothing changed the well-known Ferrara affair that
was actually a storm in a teacup exaggerated by Italian patriots. Their
zeal, on the other hand, was cleverly exploited by Charles Albert in or-
der to win popular support for his personal ambitions, which he con-
nected with those seen as “Italian”. Not only did he allow the spread
of anti-Austrian feelings in his kingdom but he also contributed to it
through the salt-wine affair, making himself the guardian of Sardinian
or, for those who wanted to believe it, Italian independence against the
alleged aggressiveness of Austria.20
In reality the Austrian Empire attracted Charles Albert’s attention
not because of her aggressiveness that was more imagined than real
– Austria acted throughout the whole period in a more moderate way
than France and Great Britain – but because of her decaying power and
Italian possessions. The Sardinian king was in the position of a beast
smelling the blood of a wounded prey, and a trophy would definitely
add much glory to his crown. He would never have dared to act in a
similar way, for example, towards France, which was in a better finan-
cial state than Austria, had territorial ambitions at his expense (Savoy
and Nice) and could use revolutionary propaganda against him, espe-
cially after the February Revolution in 1848 that established a French
Republic. In brief: the Sardinian kingdom’s war with Austria in that
year could not be excused by any moral sophistry – it resulted from
19 F. BOYER, La Seconde République, Charles-Albert et l’Italie du Nord en 1848, Paris
1967, pp. 24–25; A. COLOMBO, Carlo Alberto e la vertenza austro-sarda nel 1846,
in: Il Risorgimento italiano, 68–69, 1932, pp. 1–31; G. CONIGLIO, Orientamenti
della politica estera napoletana nel 1832–34, in: Archivio storico per le provincie
napoletane, 73, 1953, pp. 311–317; F. J. COPPA, The Origins of the Italian Wars of
Independence, London – New York 1992, p. 147.
20 R.A. AUSTENSEN, Metternich and Charles Albert. Salt, Tariffs, and the Sardinian
Challenge, 1844–1848, The Consortium of Revolutionary Europe 1750–1850, Athens
(USA) 1986, pp. 384–394.
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the territorial hunger of a smaller state that felt overburdened by the
limits of the order of the Congress of Vienna.21
It is open to discussion how far Charles Albert’s conduct in 1848
was influenced by his dislike of the imperialistic tendencies of Euro-
pean Powers and resulting distrust of the European States System, and
consequently to his reluctance to obey the rules of the latter. In any
case, from 1830 to 1848 Italy witnessed scant willingness on the part of
the Great Powers as well as the Italian states themselves to contribute
through cooperation and restraint to the pillars that upheld the sys-
tem. Italy, much like the Ottoman Empire, was an unstable area with
dangerous potential for European peace. If in the 1850s the Ottoman
Empire caused the first war among the Great Powers since 1815, then,
unsurprisingly, Italy produced the first territorial conquest in Western
Europe (not taking into the account the Russo-Ottoman War in 1828–
1829) since the same year. This fact should not be forgotten when one
attempts to evaluate the functioning of the European States System of
the Pre-March Period in an overly positive way.
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the role that Italy played in the European States
System in 1830–1848 from a new, more realist perspective paying particular atten-
tion to the policy of Metternich’s Austria in the Apennines. As it attempts to prove,
from 1830 to 1848 Italy witnessed considerable reluctance on the part of the Great
Powers as well as the Italian states themselves to contribute through cooperation and
restraint to the strengthening of the pillars that upheld the system. Italy, much like
the Ottoman Empire, was an unstable area with dangerous potential for European
peace, and it was no accident that the peace restored in 1815 was disturbed for the
first time in Western Europe during 1848 in Italy.
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21 F. R. BRIDGE – R. BULLEN, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–
1914, Harlow 2005, p. 108.
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